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IN THE AFTERMATH OF SOERING, IS INTERSTATE
EXTRADITION TO VIRGINIA ILLEGAL?
International customary law not only governs the United States relations
with other nations, but also governs the United States actions towards its
own citizens.' Generally, international customary law is part of the United
States federal common law and thereby governs federal common law ques-
tions in the absence of conflicting federal statutes.2 One principle of inter-
national customary law is the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment.3 The European Court of Human Rights (European Court)
held in the Soering Case4 that extradition from the United Kingdom of a
young, mentally unstable prisoner to Virginia's death row would constitute
inhuman and degrading treatment. 5 Following Soering, extradition of a
person into potentially inhuman and degrading conditions may violate
international customary law.6 Federal common law, incorporating customary
law, governs interstate extradition cases. Therefore, if the European Court
in Soering is correct in stating that under some circumstances Virginia's
death row inmates suffer inhuman and degrading treatment, a state may
violate federal common law by extraditing a prisoner to Virginia.
In March 1985, Jens Soering, a German citizen, allegedly committed
two homicides in Bedford County, Virginia.7 The victims were the parents
of Soering's girlfriend, Elizabeth Haysom. s Soering, who was eighteen at
the time of the homicides, allegedly murdered Haysom's parents by inflicting
multiple stabbings and slashes. 9 In October 1985, Soering and Haysom
disappeared and eventually fled to England where British authorities appre-
hended them.'0
1. See RESTATmmT (TarD) oF FoRmGN RE*Tos LAw OF TBE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) (hereinafter REsTATEN) (stating that international customary law arises
"from a general and consistenf practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation").
2. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that international law is
part of United States law); REsTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 111, comment d (stating that
international customary law is federal common law); Henkin, International Law as Law in
the United States, 82 Macr. L. REv. 1555, 1556-67 (1984) (discussing generally how international
customary law became part of federal common law); See generally Kirgis, Agora: May the
President Violate Customary International Law?, 81 Am. J. INT'L. L. 371 (1987) (arguing that
only self-executing custom becomes part- of federal common law); Klein, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13
YALE J. INT'L. L. 332 (1988) (defining self-executing custom).
3. See infra notes 46-118 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition against inhuman
and degrading treatment as customary law).
4. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
5. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
6. See infra notes 119-41 and accompanying text (discussing extradition into potentially
inhuman and degrading conditions as violation of customary international law).
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While in England, Soering admitted in a sworn statement to British
authorities that he had killed Mr. and Mrs. Haysom." Following a Virginia
grand jury indictment of Soering on two charges of capital murder, the
United States requested that Britain extradite Soering to the United States.
2
In response to the United States request, the British government sought
assurances from the United States that Soering would not receive the death
penalty. 3 In a sworn statement, the Bedford County prosecutor guaranteed
that during the sentencing hearing a United States government representative
would relate to the judge the United Kingdom's wish that the death penalty
not be imposed or executed. 4 However, the prosecutor later affirmatively
stated to United Kingdom officials that, although the representation con-
cerning the United Kingdom's wishes would still be made to the sentencing
judge, the prosecutor intended to seek the death penalty. 5
On June 16, 1987, the Bow Street Magistrates Court decided to extradite
Soering to Virginia. 6 Soering appealed to the Divisional Court arguing that
he faced a substantial risk of receiving the death penalty if extradited to
the United States.' 7 During the appeals process in England, psychiatric
evidence demonstrated that Soering suffered "profound psychiatric effects"
because of his fear of the conditions on Virginia's death row. 8 The United
Kingdom courts found the psychiatric evidence irrelevant and upheld the
lower court's decision to extradite. 9
On July 8, 1988, Soering filed an application with the European
Commission of Human Rights (Commission).2 Soering claimed that if he
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1072. The United States requested Soering's extradition in accordance with
the Extradition Treaty of 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No.
8468, stating "[Ejach Contracting Party undertakes to extradite to the other, in the circum-
stances and subject to the condition specified in this Treaty, and any person found in its
territory who has been accused or convicted of any offence [specified in the Treaty and
including murder], committed within the jurisdiction of the other party." Id. at 1076.
13. Id. at 1072.
14. Id. at 1073.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1074.
18. Id. at 1075. The psychiatric evidence demonstrated that Soering's "dread of extreme
physical violence and homosexual abuse from other inmates on death row in Virginia is...
having a profound psychiatric effect on him." Id. The intensity of Soering's fear caused the
psychiatrist who examined him to classify Soering as a suicide candidate. Id. Another psychi-
atrist determined that Soering had lost his identity due to Soering's dependence on an absorbing
relationship with Haysom, whom the psychiatrist described as a psychotically disturbed young
woman. Id. at 1074. In the psychiatrist's expert opinion, Soering was very suggestible and
believed in Haysom's "psychotic delusions." Id. According to the psychiatrist, Soering was
unable to question Haysom's judgment or the wisdom of her suggested course, because of the
extreme influence she exerted over him. Id.
19. Id. at 1075.
20. Id. at 1088. See Soering Case, Eur. Comm'n. H.R. 4(1988) (application no.




received the death penalty, he would suffer inhuman and degrading treat-
ment due to the "death row phenomenon." 21 Soering alleged that because
extradition would expose him to inhuman and degrading treatment, extra-
dition would violate the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention). 22 Although the United
Kingdom is a party to the European Convention, the United States is not.
23
Because the Commission failed to satisfactorily solve the extradition prob-
lem, the Commission, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Germany
Teferred the Soering Case to the European Court.?
The main issue before the European Court was whether Soering's
extradition to Virginia would violate article three of the European Conven-
tion. 2 Article three states, "No one shall be subjected to torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 26 Soering alleged
that extradition to Virginia would violate article three because, if extradited,
Soering risked receiving the death penalty and subsequent exposure to
inhuman degrading punishment on Virginia's death row.27 In determining
whether extradition would violate article three, the European Court consid-
ered several factors including the probability that Soering would receive the
death penalty, alleged conditions on Virginia's death row, and Soering's
age and mental condition. 28 After examining the evidence and Virginia law
of capital murder, the European Court concluded that Soering faced a
significant risk of receiving the death penalty and of being incarcerated on
Virginia's death row. 29
The European Court stated that in cases containing an article three
issue, treatment against an individual must reach a certain level of severity
before the court will classify the treatment as inhuman and degrading. 0 To
21. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1084, 1090. The death row phenomenon is the lengthy stay of
prisoners on death row and the heightened level of anxiety accompanying impending death.
Id. In Virginia, the average time between trial and death is six to eight years. Id. at 1084.
During the six to eight years a prisoner may be sent to the death house several times. Id. at
1086.
22. Id. at 1088.
23. Id. In addition to claiming that extradition violates the prohibition against inhuman
and degrading treatment contained in article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), Soering also claimed that extra-
dition to the United States would violate article 6 § 3 of the European Convention on appeal
in Virginia. Id. In addition, Soering claimed that the lack of remedy available in the United
Kingdom for breach of article 3 was a breach of article 13 of the European Convention. Id.
24. Id. at 1069.
25. Id. at 1088, 1101-04 (listing Soering's claims and showing European Court's quick
disposal of Soering's article 6 § 3 and article 13 claims).
26. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, § 1,
art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
27. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1090.
28. See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood Soering would
receive death penalty, conditions on Virginia's death row, and Soering's youth and mental
condition).
29. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1094-95.
30. Id. at 1096.
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determine severity, the European Court stated that the court considers such
factors as the nature and context of the treatment, both the mental and
physical effects, and, in certain cases, age, sex, and health of the prisoner.
31
According to the European Court, for the punishment to be classified as
inhuman and degrading, suffering experienced in connection with punish-
ment for a crime must exceed the amount of suffering and humiliation
normally associated with legitimate punishment. 32 The European Court
emphasized that the court also considers mental anguish experienced by a
prisoner in his anticipation of the execution of the punishment.
33
In determining whether treatment on Virginia's death row would con-
stitute inhuman and degrading treatment for Soering, the European Court
found that in Virginia a person sentenced to death will spend an average
of six to eight years on death row.34 Although the European Court admitted
that delays normally are due to a defendant's appeals, the court reasoned
that part of the survival instinct of human nature is to take advantage of
the appeals process." Consequently, the safeguards intended to insure that
sentencing judges and juries do not lightly impose the death penalty, extend
the periods of mental anguish preceding execution. 6
After examining the conditions on Virginia's death row, the European
Court concluded that the severity of the regime at Mecklenburg Correctional
Center, Virginia's death row, plus the extended length of a prisoner's stay,
increased the degree of severity to a level approaching inhuman and de-
grading.37 Among the conditions the European Court found objectionable
were the waist shackles that prisoners must wear when the prisoners move
about the prison and the small size of the prison cells. 38 Additionally, the
European Court noted that Mecklenburg periodically conducts "lockdowns"
that last approximately one week.39 During lockdowns inmates are confined
to their cells,4° and recreation is halted completely.41 The European Court
found the lengthy detention of prisoners on death row combined with the
mental effects caused by knowledge of impending execution to be the most
objectionable circumstances. 42
The European Court determined that the strict security at Mecklenburg




34. Id. at 1098.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1085, 1099. Mecklenburg Correctional Center is a maximum security prison
with a capacity for 335 inmates. Id. at 1085. The European Court examined the conditions at
Mecklenburg because the majority of persons facing the death penalty in Virginia are held in
that facility. Id. at 1099.
38. Id. at 1085.






Soering's youthfulness and disturbed mental state, brought the conditions
at Mecklenburg within the article three provision prohibiting inhuman and
degrading treatment. 43 The European Court further noted that Soering faced
a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment on Virginia's death row if
extradited. 44 The European Court held, therefore, that the United Kingdom's
extradition of Soering to Virginia would itself violate article three of the
Convention.
45
The Soering Case required the interpretation of a treaty provision
prohibiting inhuman or degrading conditions. 46 The prohibition against
inhuman and degrading conditions is also part of the unwritten rules of
law that nations follow.47 Such rules commonly are referred to as customary
international law.4 As part of customary international law, the prohibition
against inhuman and degrading treatment could prevent a nation from
extraditing a prisoner even though no specific treaty provision prohibiting
extradition existed.
49
Customary international law normally arises through consistent state
practice, supported by opinio juris.50 Opinio juris means that the nations
feel a legal obligation to comply with the practice in question. 5' State
practice need not be entirely consistent for a court to find an international
custom.5 2 Therefore, merely because some nations treat prisoners in an
43. Id. at 1100.
44. Id. at 1100-01.
45. Id. at 1100.
46. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing Soering's allegation that
extradition would violate article three of European Convention).
47. See infra notes 48-118 and accompanying text (examining prohibition against inhuman
and degrading treatment as part of customary international law).
48. See G. SCHWA=ZENBERGER AND E. BROWN, A MAmUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26
(6th ed. 1976) (stating that customary law refers to general practices of nations that nations
accept as law). See generally I. BROWNmE, PpaNciPLns oF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-10
(4th ed. 1990) (defining and generally discussing sources of customary law).
49. See infra notes 119-42 and accompanying text (explaining that extradition may violate
customary law prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment).
50. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 102(2) (defining customary international law as
law resulting from general and consistent practice of nations followed by nations from sense
of legal obligation); Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1, 6 (1988) (noting that customary law exists if consistent state
practice and opinio juris are present).
51. See Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (stating that custom exists
only if nations act from sense of duty); Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 9, at 1, 28 (Sept. 7) (explaining that custom exists if nations feel duty-bound to
abstain from certain practice); Weisburd, supra note 50, at 7 (stating that opinio juris exists
if state believes state has legal obligation to obey custom in question).
52. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (illustrating that state practice need not
be entirely consistent for custom to exist). In Paquete Habana, the Court stated that England
and France did not always refrain from capturing fishing vessels during war, nor did they
always feel their duty was to exercise such restraint. Id. at 691-93. However, the United States
Supreme Court found it significant that the countries had acknowledged and abided by the
rule for the one hundred years preceding the case. Id. at 694.
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inhuman and degrading manner does not mean a custom against such
treatment does not exist. Instead, custom still may exist if most nations
refrain from imposing such ill treatment, and most nations feel a duty to
refrain from exposing prisoners to inhuman and degrading treatment.
Historically, courts have used treaty law, executive orders, judicial
decisions, statutes, and the views of legal scholars to determine the existence
of state practice and opinio juris.53 Two of the most important sources that
authorities use as supporting evidence of a human rights custom are treaties
and declarations. 4 Use of treaty terms as evidence of custom is different
from use of treaty terms to bind nations that are parties to the treaty.55
When a treaty term demonstrates the existence of custom, the custom is
binding on all nations, whether the nations are parties to the treaty or not.
5 6
The content of the provision would be binding not because the provision
is part of a treaty, but because the provision states a practice recognized
by the nations as custom.5 7 A treaty may provide evidence of customary
law in three ways. First, the treaty may codify preexisting custom. Second,
the treaty may have crystallized an already forming custom. Finally, the
treaty may act as a progenitor of custom.s8 When a treaty codifies preexisting
custom, the treaty itself may state that the treaty is a codification of the
custom. If a treaty crystallizes an already forming custom, some state
practice and opinio juris will exist prior to the treaty and will increase after
53. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasizing that courts should look to works
of scholars to find evidence of customary law); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 160-61 (1820) (explaining that law of nations can be determined by looking to works of
jurists, practice of nations, and judicial decisions); I. BROWN'UE, supra note 48, at 5 (naming
fourteen sources of customary law including diplomatic correspondence, official policy state-
ments, executive orders, judicial decisions, legislation, treaties, and United Nations General
Assembly resolutions).
54. See A. D'AATo, Tam CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-38 (1971)
(examining importance of treaties in judicial decisions); Bleicher, The Legal Significance of
Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 449-51 (1969) (arguing
that resolutions in some cases state or create customary law and supply evidence of international
opinio juris); Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41
Barr. Y.B. INTr'L L. 275, 300 (1968) (stating that treaties are often cited as evidence of
customary international law and explaining probative force of treaties); but see M. AKEHuRsT,
A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATiONAL LAW 26-27 (6th ed. 1987) (questioning utility of
treaties and declarations as evidence of customary law).
55. See R. Ln.cH AND F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGHTs: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND PoucY (1979) (explaining that nonsignatory states are bound by customary law rules
incorporated into treaties, not by treaties themselves).
56. See Weisburd, supra note 50, at 3 (stating "In the highly codified humanitarian law
context, the primary and the most obvious significance of a norm's customary character is
that the norm binds states that are not parties to the instrument in which that norm is
restated").
57. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 4, 38 (asserting that treaty terms that state customary law bind nations who are not
parties to treaty).
58. See id. at 41 (stating that if treaty term neither codifies nor crystallized customary
law, treaty may still act as progenitor of custom).
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the treaty. The practice may exist among nations that have signed the treaty
and nations that have not. The important point is that the practice should
be the product of an obligation felt by the state, not motivated out of
convenience or mere courtesy. As a progenitor of custom, the treaty will
declare the law as it should be, and the rule will become widely practiced
and recognized by affected states. I
In addition to state practice, the subject matter and structure of a treaty
may also be important in ascertaining whether the treaty establishes custom.59
If the treaty allows reservations6° to the term proposed as custom, then the
treaty is not good evidence of custom. 61 If several treaties repeat the treaty
term and the term is nonderogable, a tribunal is much more likely to
determine that the treaty term demonstrates the existence of custom. 62
An examination of human rights treaties reveals that several treaties
prohibit inhuman and degrading treatment. 63 These treaty prohibitions are
nonderogable and absolute.64 Treaty provisions that prohibit inhuman and
degrading treatment appear to be representative of custom but are difficult
to categorize. 65 Whether the provision against inhuman and degrading
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining that nonderogable terms
and repetition of terms in several treaties increases likelihood that terms represent custom).
60. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(d), U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, U.N. Sales No. E.70.V.6 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875
(1969). A reservation is a clause added to the end of a treaty by a signing party, which excepts
the party from certain duties or modifies the party's obligations under the treaty. Id.
61. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 39-40 (stating that treaty
provisions that allow reservations cannot represent custom because obligations of custom apply
equally to all nations).
62. See Filartiga v. Pena-Iraa, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding evidence of custom
against torture through repetition of treaty terms prohibiting torture and through nonderogable
nature of treaty terms).
63. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (stating that no person should be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment); European Convention, supra note 26, art. 3 (same); American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art 5(2), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970) (same); Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art.
5, Organization of African Unity Document CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, (1981) reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 58,59 (1982) (stating that all forms of exploitation and degradation of man are
prohibited, including inhuman and degrading treatment); Declaration of the Basic Duties of
ASEAN Peoples and Governments, Dec. 9, 1983, art. 10, reprinted in A. BLAuSTEIN, R.
CLARK, J. SIGLER, HUMAN RIOHTS SOURCE BOOK, 646, 654-57 (1987) (prohibiting cruel and
degrading treatment or punishment).
64. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EuR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. 602, 752
(holding that under article three of European Convention, emergency situations cannot justify
application of torture); Tyrer Case, 1978 Y.B. Etm. CoNy. ON HuM. RTs. 612, 616 (stating
that degrading punishment in violation of European Convention article three is never justified
under European Convention even if government demonstrates that law and order cannot be
maintained without using degrading punishment); Banjul Charter on Human And Peoples'
Rights, supra note 63 (containing no reservation clauses); P. SiosHART, Tan INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 161 (1982) (asserting that many treaties allow no derogation from
prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment).
65. See Declaration of the Basic Duties of ASEAN Peoples' and Governments, supra
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treatment codified an already existing custom or acted as a progenitor of
custom is unclear, because pinpointing exactly when a custom comes into
existence is difficult. Standing alone, the existence of treaty terms containing
the prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment does not defini-
tively prove that the prohibition is part of customary law. However, the
repetition of the terms throughout many treaties and the widespread support
that these treaties enjoy is certainly strong evidence of a custom prohibiting
inhuman and degrading treatment."
In addition to treaties, United Nations General Assembly resolutions
sometimes provide evidence of international customary law.6 International
tribunals have used United Nations declarations as evidence of customary
law, and the International Court of Justice has stated that consent to
authoritative General Assembly Resolutions is evidence of a nation's opinio
juris." In the area of expropriations decisions made by arbitrators, arbitra-
tors have stated that United Nations Resolution 1803 (Resolution 1803),
which provides a scheme for compensation in expropriation cases, reflects
note 62 (exhibiting strong evidence of custom against inhuman and degrading treatment). The
ASEAN declaration states principles in terms of duties instead of rights. Id. For instance,
article 10 states "It is the duty of government, under any and all circumstances, to refrain
from engaging in or authorizing torture, other cruel and degrading treatment or punishment,
unexplained disappearances and extra-legal execution, and to take steps to eliminate such
practices by others." Id.
66. See International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, supra note 63 (consisting
of 89 members as of Jan. 1, 1990); European Convention, supra note 26 (consisting of 23
members as of Nov. 8, 1989); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 63 (consisting
of 21 members as of Jan. 1, 1990); Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra
note 63 (consisting of 38 members as of Jan. 1, 1990); Declaration of the Basic Duties of
ASEAN Peoples and Governments, supra note 63 (consisting of six members as of 1987).
67. See I. BRowNLIE, supra note 48, at 14-15 (stating that resolutions can serve as
evidence of customary law and enumerating important "law-making" resolutions); M. AXE-
HURsT, supra note 54, at 27 (stating that resolutions that address general international law
norms sometimes are evidence of custom); G. voN GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIoNs: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO PUBuc ImENATIONAL LAW 20 (4th ed. 1981) (asserting that resolutions may
serve as first phase in development of new rules of customary international law); J. STRa,
AN INcoDucTIoN TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-51 (9th ed. 1984) (stating that resolutions may
lead to formation of international custom).
Several United Nations Declarations contain prohibitions against inhuman and degrading
treatment. See U.N. Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals
of the Country in which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144 (1985), art. six (stating "No alien shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) G.A. Res. 34/169, 34 U.N. GAOR (Supp.
No. 46) at 185, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1979), article five (stating "No law enforcement official
may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, nor may any law enforcement official invoke superior orders or
exceptional circumstances ... or any other public emergency as a justification of torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment").
68. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 25 (stating that consent to authoritative General Assembly Resolutions is
evidence of nation's opinio juris).
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customary law.69 One arbitrator relied on the fact that Resolution 1803 had
been accepted by consensus and by a broad range of interested members.70
Therefore, precedent exists for accepting United Nations declarations as
reflective of customary law.
As further evidence that resolutions may state customary law, a United'
States court of appeals has stated that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), a United Nations resolution, reflects international custom-
ary law and is binding on the United States.71 The UDHR is a declaration
of the United Nations General Assembly that codified the United Nations
view of how nations should treat citizens and aliens. 72 At the time of the
UDHR's adoption, the United Nations General Assembly did not view the
UDHR as a codification of customary law.73 Over time, however, many
scholars have come to view the UDHR as reflective of custom.74 In order
for the UDHR or any other United Nations declaration to provide evidence
69. See Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 180, 25 I.L.M.
629, 634 (1986) (stating that Resolution 1803 reflects customary international law and referring
to 1803 in determining what type of compensation complies with custom); Libyan American
Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20 I.L.M. 1, 67 (1981) (stating that Resolution 1803 is
evidence of international opinion and awarding compensation for expropriation in accordance
with Resolution 1803); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./ California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 30 (1977) (stating that Resolution 1803 reflects state of customary
law in field of expropriations).
70. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./ California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 30 (1978) (finding that of several United Nations General Assembly
resolutions concerning expropriation, only Resolution 1803 could be considered reflective of
customary law). The arbitrator stated that unlike other expropriation resolutions, Resolution
1803 "was supported by a majority of Member States representing all of the various groups
(developed and undeveloped countries)." Id.
71. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-883 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that Universal
Declaration of Human Rights reflects customary law and is binding on United States).
72. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3(1) U.N. GAOR
Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 Am. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 127 (1949) [hereinafter
UDHR].
73. See Schwelb, The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
International and National Law, 1959 Am. Socy. Int'l Law Proceedings 217, reprinted in R.
LtLiCH AND E. NEWMAN, supra note 55, at 60 (illustrating that authors of UDHR originally
did not consider UDHR to be binding); Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: Its History Impact and Juridical Character, reprinted in B. RA cHARAN, HUMAN
RxGors: TmRTY YEARs A Hrr a UrvaaEs DECLARATION 21, 32 (1978) (stating that UDHR
was not meant by United Nations General Assembly members to be binding). Humphrey states
"Nothing could be clearer than that the Declaration was never meant to be binding as part
of international law . . ." Id. In fact, several delegations stressed that they did not consider
the resolution to be binding. Id. To become binding international law, General Assembly
resolutions, which are normally only recommendations, must become part of customary law.
Id. at 33.
74. See R. LrLLUCH AND E. NEWMAN, supra note 54, at 65-66 (stating that UDHR has
come to represent custom); I. BROWNLE, supra note 47, at 14, 698 (stating that UDHR
represents at least customary law); M. McDouGAL, H. LAsSWELL, & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIosS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 274 (1980) (stating that resolutions now accept UDHR as customary
law).
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of custom, the declaration should contain authoritative language.75 For
example, a resolution using "shall" in place of "may" is phrased author-
itatively. The General Assembly used "shall" language in declaring that
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman and degrading
'treatment or punishment" and stated the UDHR's other articles as if the
articles were the law, not recommendations.7 6 A declaration's value as
evidence of custom is also increased if a large number of member states
vote in favor of the declaration. 77 When the United Nations adopted the
UDHR in 1948 the vote was forty-eight to none with eight abstentions.78
Because the General Assembly stated the rules contained in the UDHR
authoritatively, and members overwhelmingly supported the UDHR, the
UDHR is strong evidence of a custom prohibiting inhuman and degrading
treatment.
Other commentators, however, view the UDHR not only as a statement
of customary law, but also as an official interpretation of articles fifty-five
and fifty-six of the United Nations Charter. 79 Article fifty-five states that
members of the United Nations should promote observance of human
rights.80 In article fifty-six members of the United Nations pledge to take
action to achieve the purposes of article fifty-five.8' Because of the generality
75. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 103 reporters' note 2, (stating that resolution
which purports to state law is evidence of custom); M. AKEHuasr, supra note 53, at 27
(arguing that in order for resolutions to be given effect, authoritative language must be used).
76. UDHR, supra note 72, art. 5. Several UDHR articles provide examples of authori-
tative and forceful language. See article 4 (stating that "No one shall be held in slavery or
servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms"); Article 9 (stating
that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile"); Article 11(2) (stating
that "No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable
at the time the penal offence was committed"); Article 15(2) (stating that "No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality").
77. See M. AKEHtJRST, supra note 53, at 27 (stating that value of resolution as custom
increases if large number of member states vote for resolution); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 48,
at 14 (finding that when resolutions concern general norms of international law and are
accepted by large majority, resolutions are evidence of custom).
78. See S. SOHN AND I. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
515 (1973) (stating that of 58 members of United Nations, 48 members voted for UDHR and
eight abstained).
79. See P. SIEGHART, supra note 64, at 53-54 (finding UDHR to be authoritative
interpretation of articles 55 and 56 of United Nations Charter); Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U.L. RaV. 1, 17
(1982) (stating that UDHR provides specificity that United Nations Charter lacks and finding
that United Nations views UDHR as official interpretation of articles 55 and 56 of United
Nations Charter).
80. U.N. CHARTER, reprinted in R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGrs INSTRUMENTS,
10.1 (1990). Article 55 states: "[T]he United Nations shall promote: ... universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion." Id.
81. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 80. Article 56 states: "All Members pledge themselves to
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id.
1486
INTERSTATE EXTRADITION
of articles fifty-five and fifty-six, United States courts have held that the
terms of the articles by themselves cannot be given effect as federal law;
the terms are not self-executing 2 Unlike articles fifty-five and fifty-six, the
UDHR specifically lists human rights that nations should observe."3 The
UDHR explicitly prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment.8 The UDHR,
if treated as an official interpretation of articles fifty-five and fifty-six of
the United Nations Charter, makes the prohibition against inhuman and
degrading treatment part of articles fifty-five and fifty-six. 83 Under this
theory the interpretation become part of the article much like a United
States court interpretation of a federal statute becomes binding as part of
the statute. The United States is a member of the United Nations Charter;
therefore, under the theory that the UDHR is an official interpretation of
the United Nations Charter, the United States is bound by the prohibition
against inhuman and degrading treatment contained in the UDHR. s6
In addition to United Nations declarations, the Restatement of United
States Foreign Relations Law (Restatement) also serves as evidence of
customary international law. The drafters of the Restatement attempt to
clarify and simplify existing international law. In determining international
custom, the legal scholars who assemble the Restatement rely upon evidence
of state practice and attitudes of the international community. 7 Section 702
82. See Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) (holding that United Nations Charter, article 55 is not self-
executing and therefore not enforceable); Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (ruling that general wording of United Nations Charter, article 55 shows that article was
not meant to be self-executing); Sei Fuji v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617, 621-22 (1952)
(holding articles 55 and 56 of United Nations Charter "lack mandatory quality and definiteness"
and are not self-executing).
83. UDHR, supra note 71. The UDHR includes among the human rights that nations
should observe the right to life, liberty and security of person, the prohibition against slavery,
the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the
right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to equal protection under the law,
the right to an effective remedy for violations of fundamental rights granted by the constitution
or the law, the prohibition against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, the right to a fair and
public hearing by an impartial tribunal, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty,
and a prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id.
84. See UDHR, supra note 71, art. 5 (stating that "No one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment").
85. See Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 Wm.
& MARY L. Rv. 527, 529 (1976) (stating that as official inferpretation of United Nations
Charter, articles 55 and 56, UDHR is binding upon United Nations members); M. McDouoAL,
H. LAsswna, & L. CHES, supra note 73, at 273-74 (accepting UDHR as "quasi-legislation").
86. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (providing that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding"). Once treaty provisions become self-executing, the
provisions are the supreme law of the land. Id. See generally I. BRowvNL., supra note 48, at
11-15; HuMAN RMoms: THmrTY YEARS A THE .UNIVERSALI DECL4RATiON, 1-37 (B. Ramcharan
ed. 1979).
87. See RESTATE ENT, supra note 1, § 701 (listing sources for determining practice of
states and thereby determining makeup of customary human rights law).
1991] 1487
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 48:1477
of the Restatement identifies international human rights customs that the
authors have determined are peremptory norms. Peremptory norms are
customs which are so compelling and widely observed that they are consid-
ered the highest ranking authority in international law.88 Because of the
compelling nature of peremptory norms, treaties are considered void if the
treaties violate peremptory norms.s9 Peremptory norms are also absolutely
binding on all states, meaning that states may not opt out of the norms.9
In contrast, a nation may opt out or exempt itself from normal customs
by making known its opposition to the custom early in the development of
the custom and by consistently voicing the nation's opposition to the
custom.9r
The Restatement reports that at least six practices exist that violate
peremptory norms if the practices occur as a result of state policy: genocide,
slavery, murder, torture or other inhuman and degrading punishment or
treatment, prolonged arbitrary detention and systematic racial discrimina-
tion. 92 Because the Restatement is a statement and clarification of the
international rules which govern United States law, United States courts
respect and refer to the Restatement in determining what is international
law.93 Therefore, United States courts should be willing to find an inter-
national custom prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment.
In addition to the drafters of the Restatement, many other international
law scholars discuss customs that have risen to the level of peremptory
88. See Committee of United States Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that peremptory norms are highest laws in hierarchy of international
law, outranking both treaties and customary law); Parker & Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling
the Law of Human Rights, 12 HAsTiNG INT'L & Comp. L. Rav. 411, 417 (1989) (asserting that
peremptory norms are highest rules in hierarchy of international law); Janis, The Nature of
Jus Cogens in colloquy with Turpel & Sands, Peremptory International Law and Sovereignty:
Some Questions, 3 CoN. J. INT'L L. 359, 363 (1988) (arguing that peremptory norms are
"international constitutional law" serving as foundations for international legal system).
89. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 53 (stating that
"A treaty is void if, at the time~of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law"); REsTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 702, comment n (stating that treaties
which violate peremptory norms are void).
90. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U. S.),
1986 IC.J. 14, 114, 238 (finding that United States was bound by peremptory norm prohibiting
aggressive use of force, even though United States persistently objected to rule); Parker &
Neylon, supra note 88, at 418 (stating that peremptory norms are absolutely binding rules
which states may not opt out of, even through persistent objection).
91. See I. BRowNM, supra note 48, at 10-11 (stating that if nation persistently objects
to custom during formation of custom, nation is not bound by custom).
92. RESTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 702.
93. See Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (citing Restatement's definition of customary law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987) reconsideration granted in part, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (citing Restatement as evidence that law of nations prohibits murder condoned by
government); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp 1177, 1188 (D. Conn. 1980) aff'd in part and




norms. 4 Customs concerning human rights often are considered peremptory
norms, because customs spring from ethical considerations and a sense of
justice.95 However, peremptory norms are not created by scholars, judicial
bodies, or international organizations, but instead exist because of an
international consensus.9 Most scholars and nations recognize torture as
having the status of a peremptory norm, but the international consensus is
not as strong in the case of inhuman and degrading treatmentY
In addition to torture, the prohibition against inhuman and degrading
treatment may have risen to the level of a peremptory norm.9 The Restate-
ment and the treaties that prohibit torture all group torture with inhuman
and degrading treatment.99 Inhuman and degrading treatment is prohibited
94. See RETATEmENT, supra note 1, § 702 (listing peremptory norms); L. HAN uCNEN,
PEREm To Ry Nosuss (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 425-519 (1988) (discussing in detail
human rights customs which have achieved status of peremptory norms); I. BRowmm, supra
note 47, at 513 (stating that prohibition of use of force, genocide, racial discrimination,
slavery, piracy, and crimes against humanity are relatively uncontroversial examples of per-
emptory norms); Robledo, Le Ius Cogens International: sa Genese, sa Nature, ses Fonctions,
172 REcuEm DES Cours 9, 167-87 (1981) (discussing identification of peremptory norms and
violations of customary human rights law which qualify as violations of peremptory norms).
95. See South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa),
1966 I.C.J. 6, 298 (Tanaka, J., dissenting) (arguing that whole of human rights law constitutes
peremptory norms); Parker & Neylon, supra note 88, at 419-422 (illustrating that peremptory
norms are based upon religious, secular, or philosophical ideas of what is just).
96. See U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st and 2d Sess. Vienna, Mar. 26 -
May 24, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./39/11/Add. 2 (1971), statement of Mr. Suarez (Mexico)
at 294 (stating that peremptory norms have always existed); Parker & Neylon, supra note 87,
at 419-420 (finding that peremptory norms arise from natural law principles or universal ethical
standards).
97. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 702 (finding that torture violates peremptory
norm); L. HA mIEN, supra note 94, at 502 (stating that prohibition against torture is
peremptory norm); Parker & Neylon, supra note 87, at 437 (asserting that torture is commonly
recognized as violating peremptory norm); Higgins, Derogation Under Human Rights Treaties,
48 Br. Y:B. INT'L L. 281, 282 (1976-77) (noting that consensus exists that freedom from
torture is fundamental right which may not be derogated).
98. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 702(d), comment n (asserting that prohibition
against inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is peremptory norm); A. CASSESE,
Hum.x RIGrs IN A CHANGING WO= 166 (1990) (discussing Swiss Federal Court opinion
stating that prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment had attained status of
peremptory norm); M. McDouGAL, H. LAsswumi, & L. CEMN, supra note 74, at 274 (asserting
that all prohibitions of UDHR are peremptory norms); but see L. HANNncAiNEN, supra note
94, at 499-510 (questioning whether inhuman and degrading treatment has become violation
of peremptory norm).
99. See European Convention, supra note 26, art. 3 (stating that "No one shall be
subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 63, art. 5(2) (stating that "No one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment"); Banjul Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 63, art. 5 (stating that "All forms of exploitation
and degredation of man particularly.., torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and
treatment shall be prohibited"); REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 702(d) (stating that "A state
violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones
... torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment").
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within the same sentence and with the same force as torture.1'0 However,
due to the evolving nature of the terms "inhuman and degrading," courts
are more likely to apply the prohibition as a part of customary law rather
than as a peremptory norm.
Although inhuman and degrading treatment is more difficult to define
than torture,10' definitions and examples of inhuman and degrading treat-
ment are available in the opinions of the European Court of Human Rights,
the European Commission of Human Rights, and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (Committee) and within international instru-
ments.02° The most widely accepted definition is the definition authored by
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (demonstrating that torture and inhuman
and degrading treatment are prohibited in same sentence and with same force).
101. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), substantive revisions printed
in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. The Convention Against
Torture provides:
The term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescience of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions.
Id.
102. See Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted Aug. 30, 1955
by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, U.N. Doe. A/CONF/6/1, annex I, A (1956), amended May 13, 1977, E.S.C. Res.
2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), art. 31-32(2) (stating
that applying punishment prejudicial to physical or mental health of prisoners is inhuman
treatment); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, § 2, G.A. Res. 3452,
30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) (stating "torture constitutes
an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment");
Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. EuR. CoNV. ON Hum. Ris., 602, 604 (Eur.
Ct. H.R.) (stating that interrogation techniques of hooding, subjecting prisoners to continuous
loud, hissing noise, depriving prisoners of sleep, reducing prisoners' diets, and forcing prisoners
to stand for long periods against wall in painful position used by British forces amounted to
inhuman and degrading treatment, but did not reoch level of torture); Tyrer Case, 1978 Y.B.
EuR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 612, 614 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (stating that birching school child is
degrading treatment); East African Asians, 1970 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HuM. RTs. 928, 972
(Eur. Comm. H.R.) (stating that degrading treatment is treatment, "lowering in rank, position,
reputation, or character" which lowers the recipient in his eyes or the eyes of others and
holding that government's taking away citizenship and making East Afican Asians stateless
was degrading treatment); The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EuR. CoN . ON HuM. RTS. 1, 186 (Eur.
Comm. H.R.) (stating that inhuman treatment is at least treatment that deliberately causes
severe mental or physical suffering and explaining that degrading treatment "grossly humiliates
[the recipient] before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience"); Pratt v.
Jamaica, 44 U.N. GAOR supp. 40 at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (U.N. H.R. Comm.) (stating
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the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court stated that
inhuman treatment is at least treatment which leads to physical or mental
suffering. 103 Degrading treatment is treatment that arouses "fear, anguish
and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing" the victim and that
may break the victim's moral resistance. 104 The European Court consistently
uses these definitions in determining what constitutes inhuman and degrading
treatment.10 Treatise writers use the European Court's definition to explain
inhuman and degrading treatment,10° and at least one federal district court
has used the European Court's definition.107
In addition to the European Court's decision in Soering, Pratt v.
Jamaica08 sheds light on what conditions specifically can qualify as inhuman
that delay of almost twenty hours from time petitioner's stay of execution was granted to time
he was removed from death cell amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and commenting
that prolonged judicial proceedings in capital punishment case might be inhuman and de-
grading); Acosta v. Uruguay, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 40 at 183, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (U.N.
H.R. Comm.) (ruling that Acosta suffered inhuman and degrading treatment because forced
to stand for long periods of time in cold with nothing to drink or eat); Bouton v. Uruguay,
36 U.N. QAOR supp. 40 at 143, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (U.N. H.R. Comm.) (finding inhuman
and degrading treatment in the absence of torture). Members of the Joint Forces made Ms.
Bouton stand for thirty-five hours, tied her wrist with coarse cloth, bandaged her eyes, and
threatened to torture her. Id. Later the Joint Forces kept Ms. Bouton sitting blindfolded on
a mattress and did not allow her to move. Id. Ms. Bouton could bathe only every ten to
fifteen days. Id.
103. Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. Eupt. CoN . ON Hum. RTS. at 606.
104. The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON Hum. RTs. at 186.
105. See Soering Case, 28 I.L.M. 1063, 1096 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (citing definition of inhuman
and degrading treatment contained in both Ireland Case and Greek Case); Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. EuR. CONV. ON Hum. RTs. 602, 604-606 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (repeating
definition of inhuman and degrading treatment from Greek Case); The East African Asians
Case, 1970 Y.B. Etn. CoNv. ON Hum. RTs. 928, 972 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (quoting definition of
degrading treatment from Greek Case).
106. See 1 T. MERON, HUMAN RimsiS N INERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
128 (1984) (using European Court's definition of inhuman and degrading treatment to illuminate
meaning of inhuman and degrading as contained in Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
article five); E. DABs, Tam INvimuAL's DUTIEs TO Tm CommuN-y AND THE LIMITATIoNs ON
HUMAN RiGorS AND FRlEEoDMS UNDER ARTCicL 29 OF TH UNmWsAL DECLRATION OF HUMAN
RiHTs, UNITED NATIONS E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1983) (giving definition similar to Euro-
pean Court's definition). Daes states 'Inhuman treatment' means the deliberate infliction of
physical or mental pain or suffering against the will of the victim. Degrading should also
cover degrading situations which under certain circumstances might be the result of the
application of unjust or wrong economic or social factors or a tyrannical and oppressive
national policy in general." Id. See also L. HANNELMN, supra note 94, at 507-09 (1988)
(discussing the European Court's definition, but also stating, "There is no accepted definition
of 'cruel, inhuman of degrading treatment or punishment'); P. SmonHsT, supra note 64, at
167-69 (1983) (explaining meaning of inhuman and degrading treatment by using European
Court's definition); F. JACOBS, Tan EUROPE" CONVENTION ON HUM RiGHTs 26-36 (1975)
(referring to definition contained in Greek Case as explanation of meaning of inhuman and
degrading treatment).
107. See Abmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying European
Court's definition of inhuman and degrading treatment), aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
108. 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40 at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989) (U.N. H.R.
Comm.).
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and degrading. In Pratt, defendant Pratt allegedly committed capital murder
on October 6, 1977 and first stood trial on January 15, 1979.'09 The Jamaican
Home Circuit Court at Kingston found Pratt guilty and sentenced him to
death."10 The Jamaican courts ruled against Pratt on all of his appeals, and
on February 13, 1987, issued a warrant for Pratt's execution."' During all
phases of the appeals, Jamaican authorities detained Pratt within the section
of the prison reserved for prisoners awaiting execution."12 The day before
Pratt's scheduled execution, the state granted a stay of execution; 13 however,
the prison officials did. not inform Pratt of the stay until forty-five minutes
prior to the time of his execution."14 In his appeal to the committee, Pratt
maintained that the delays in the judicial proceedings and his detention on
death row since the time of his conviction in 1979 amounted to cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment."' The Committee reasoned that delay in
a capital case can constitute such treatment, but the Committee held that
Pratt had not made a sufficient showing that the delay in Pratt's case
constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment." 6 The Committee did
not actually address the issue of whether prolonged detention on death row
constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment." 7 However, the Committee
did hold that the delay of twenty hours from the time of Pratt's stay of
execution to the time prison authorities informed Pratt that his execution
had been stayed amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment." 8 Pratt
leaves open the question of whether the long appeals process for United
States capital cases amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment.
As illustrated above, inhuman and degrading treatment by itself is a
violation of international customary law." 9 Additionally, extradition into a
country where the extraditee may experience inhuman and degrading treat-
ment violates international customary law. '2 In Soering, the European Court
determined whether extradition that might result in exposing Soering to
inhuman and degrading conditions would violate a treaty provision prohib-
iting inhuman and degrading treatment.' 2' The European Court concluded
that the United Kingdom would violate the treaty provision if it extradited
109. Pratt v. Jamaica, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989)
(U.N. H.R. Comm.).
110. Id.




115. Id. at 223-24.
116. Id. at 230.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 46-118 and accompanying text (arguing that inhuman and degrading
treatment violates customary international law).
120. See infra notes 121-142 and accompanying text (discussing extradition as violation
of customary international law).
121. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063, 1090.
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Soering to Virginia.' 2 Because the prohibition against inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment is also found in customary international law, the extradition
would have been unlawful even in the absence of a treaty. The European
Court, however, did not decide whether inhuman and degrading treatment
is a violation of customary law, because the European Court does not have
jurisdiction to determine the violation of custom.
In Soering, the United Kingdom argued that Soering's extradition would
violate article three of the Convention only if the degrading treatment
resulting from extradition was "certain, imminent and serious."' 123 The
European Court rejected the United Kingdom's argument.12 Instead the
European Court held that extradition would violate article three of the
Convention if the extraditee established on substantial grounds that the
extraditee faced a real risk of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment.'2
The European Court has consistently stated that extradition may violate
article three of the European Convention if exceptional circumstances are
present.' 6 To establish that exceptional circumstances exist, the extraditee
must show that the extraditee faces a real risk of treatment prohibited by
article three. 2 7 According to the European Court, Soering made this showing
by introducing statements of the Virginia prosecutor that the prosecutor
intended to prosecute Soering for capital murder,l 2 and that if Soering
were extradited to the United States he faced "some risk" which was "more
than merely negligible" of receiving the death penalty. 2 9 The European
Court held that Soering faced a real risk of receiving the death penalty and,
therefore, of being exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment on Virgi-
nia's death row at Mecklenburg.
30
Although article three does not mention extradition, the European
Court's interpretation of article three makes extradition under exceptional
circumstances a violation of the Convention.131 As a widely adopted treaty,
122. Id. at 1107.
123. Id. at 1090.
124. Id. at 1090-91. The European Court reasoned that because the provision against
inhuman and degrading treatment is a nonderogable provision and because it is an interna-
tionally accepted standard, the spirit and intention of article 3 demanded a somewhat broad
interpretation. Id. According to the European Court the United Kingdom's test would not
sufficiently protect an individual's rights because the test would require "a very high degree
of risk, proved beyond reasonable doubt, that in-treatment will actually occur" in the
demanding state. Id. at 1090.
125. Id. at 1093.
126. See infra note 131 (enumerating European Court cases which examine whether
extradition is inhuman and degrading); Digest of Strasbourg Case-Law Relating to the European
Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, 117-155 (discussing extradition as violation of European
Convention, article three); P. SmIGART, supra note 64, 168 n. 4648 (1983) (discussing
extradition as inhuman and degrading).
127. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063, 1092.
128. Id. at 1073.
129. Id. at 1094.
130. Id. at 1095.
131. See Lynas v. Switzerland, 6 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 141 (1976) (discussing whether
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the European Conventions prohibition against extradition as inhuman and
degrading treatment may crystallize a custom prohibiting extradition when
a substantial risk exists that the extraditee will be subjected to inhuman and
degrading treatment.1 2 In addition to the European Court, international
law scholars have determined that if substantial grounds exist to believe
that extradition will expose someone to inhuman and degrading treatment,
the extradition itself amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment.'33 The
extradition is more likely to reach the degree of severity required for
inhuman and degrading treatment if the extraditee's mental health is so
fragile that the extradition might lead to serious health problems or to
suicide. 34
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against
Torture) states that if substantial grounds exist for believing an extraditee
will be in danger of torture, the nation shall not extradite. 3 ' The United
Nations General Assembly has accepted the Convention Against Torture as
a codification of custom. 13 6 Therefore, extradition iffto a torture situation
extradition into country where government agent may murder extraditee is inhuman and
degrading). In Lynas the European Commission stated that "a person's extradition may, in
exceptional circumstances, be contrary to the Convention and, in particular, Article 3, where
there are strong reasons to believe that this person will be subject to treatment prohibited by
that Article, in the country to which he is being sent." Id.; X. v. Federal Republic of Germany,
5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 137 (1976) (discussing whether extradition of X into country where he
may be executed by nongovernmental group is inhuman and degrading). The European
Commission stated, "The expulsion of an individual to a particular country can, under
exceptional circumstances be contrary to Article 3." Id.; Becker v. Denmark, 4 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. 215 (1975) (considering whether return of Montagnard children to Vietnam violates
European Convention, article 3); Brnckmann v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1974 Y.B. EUR.
CoNv. oN H.R. 458, 476 (1974) (Eur. Comm. H.R.) (examining whether extradition of
Brnckmann was inhuman and degrading in light of danger she may have committed suicide if
extradited).
132. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark
and The Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 38 (discussing crystallization of custom).
133. See P. SiaH.ART, supra note 64, at 168 (asserting that extradition is inhuman and
degrading if substantial risk exists that extraditee will be subjected to inhuman and degrading
treatment in receiving state); A. CAssEsE, supra note 98, at 166 (stating that extradition clauses
must be interpreted in light of custom prohibiting torture or any other inhuman and degrading
treatment); Quigley & Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to
Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT 'L L. 241, 271 n. 177 (1989) (stating that extradition to
death row may violate international custom prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment).
134. See Brnckmann v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1974 Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON H.R.
458, 476 (Eur. Comm. H.R.) (1974) (accepting Bruckmann's application which alleged that
extradition to East Germany would be inhuman and degrading treatment). The Commission
gave special consideration to the fact that Bruckmann might commit suicide if extradited. Id.
Bruckman had already attempted suicide twice and had gone on a hunger strike. Id.; see also
P. SEEGHART, supra note 64, at 168 (finding extradition is more likely to be inhuman and
degrading if extradition might lead to serious health problems or suicide).
135. Convention Against Torture, supra note 101.
136. See id. at paragraph five (stating that United Nations General Assembly intended to
achieve "a more effective implementation of the existing prohibition under international and
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is a violation of custom. 37 Although the Convention Against Torture does
not extend the prohibition to inhuman and degrading conditions, the Con-
vention Against Torture does recognize that facilitating a human rights
violation by another state through extradition can violate customary law.'
Because of the close relationship between torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment, the prohibition may extend to inhuman and degrading treatment
under customary law. 39
To summarize, the prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment
is part of customary international law which is binding upon nations.1
4
0
Under the rationale of Soering and other European Court decisions, extra-
dition where a real risk exists of the extraditee being subjected to inhuman
and degrading treatment is a violation of the prohibition against inhuman
and degrading treatment. 4' Finally, extradition may violate not only article
three of the European Convention, but also the prohibition against inhuman
and degrading treatment contained in international customary law.
42
As stated earlier, once a court determines that an international custom
exists, generally that custom becomes a part of United States federal
common law. 43 Courts should apply federal common law cases concerning
national law of the practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment"); U.N. G.A. Res. 39/118, passed Dec. 14, 1984 (reiterating General Assembly's
belief that Convention codified existing customary law by referring to "the existing prohibition
under international law of every form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment"); Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REv. 349,
392 (1988) (stating that Convention Against Torture codified or crystallized custom).
137. See supra notes 53-78 and accompanying text (discussing treaties and declarations
that codify custom).
138. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 101, art. 3(1) (stating "No State Party
shall ... extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture").
139. See id. at art. 16(2) (stating that Convention's provisions are without prejudice to
international instruments or national laws relating to extradition). Article 16 seems to be at
odds with article 3. Id. Arguably, a nation cannot deny extradition under article 3 without
using the Convention to prejudice an international extradition agreement as prohibited by
article 16. One way to avoid this conflict is to interpret article 16 to mean that the Convention
Against Torture must not be invoked by a nation in bad faith.
140. See supra notes 46-118 and accompanying text (arguing that infliction of inhuman
and degrading treatment violates customary international law).
141. See supra notes 119-42 and accompanying text (discussing extradition as violation of
customary international law).
142. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing treaty provisions as reflec-
tions of customary international law).
143. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 702(c) (observing that customary human rights
law is part of United States law and should be applied by both state and federal courts);
Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights
by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. OF INT'L L. 332, 347 (1988) (stating that federal common law
incorporates the norms of international law); Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1561-62 (1984) (arguing that because judges find international
law instead of make international law, it is not true common law, but nevertheless should be
applied like common law); Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HA~v. INT'L L. J.
53, 57-58 (1981) (stating that international customary law is part of federal common law).
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the rights and duties of the United States in cases involving interstate or
international disputes where the rights of the states or nations are in conflict
and in cases of admiralty.'" Federal common law applies to extradition,
because extradition involves potential conflicts of rights between the states.
45
Federal common law, however, will not apply if the common law is in
direct conflict with federal statutory law.'" Therefore, if the custom against
inhuman and degrading treatment is in conflict with a federal statute
governing extradition, the statute, not custom, will apply 47 Although courts
have interpreted the extradition clause of the Constitution and the Extra-
dition Act in ways which may impede implementation by courts of the
custom against inhuman and degrading treatment in extradition cases in-
volving both international and interstate extradition, neither the Constitution
nor the Extradition Act is in direct conflict.'" However, once a court
acknowledges that federal common law prohibits inhuman and degrading
treatment, the court should interpret extradition statutes so as not to conflict
with federal common law.
49
144. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
(stating that courts should refer to federal common law in interstate and international disputes
and cases of admiralty); FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MMuaLR, Crvm PROCEDURE, 223 (1989) (stating
that courts apply federal common law most often in cases of admiralty, interstate disputes,
international relations, and federal statutory gaps).
145. See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641 (discussing application of federal common law
to interstate disputes); FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MIL.R, supra note 144, at 225 (same).
146. See Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority., 730 F.2d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating
that if Congress has legislhted on subject, federal legislation should be applied in place of
federal common law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
316 (1981) (stating that when federal common law conflicts with federal statutory law, courts
should apply statutory law); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 115 (finding that when federal
statute conflicts with prior rule of customary law, courts should apply federal statute).
147. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 115 (asserting that prior rule of customary law
may be superseded by federal statute); R. LMucH, INVoCING INTERNATIONAL Humsa RIoHs
LAW IN DoMEsTIc COURTS (1985) (noting that subsequent federal statutes take precedence over
conflicting rules of customary international law); But see Henkin, supra note 143, at 1561-67
(arguing that customary law is equal in authority to federal statutes and courts should give
effect to customary law in face of earlier conflicting federal statutes); see generally Goldklang,
Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary
International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143 (1985) (concluding that United States statutes take
precedence over international customary law).
148. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that "a Person charged in any State with
Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the Executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up,
to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime"); 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1948)
(stating that if state executive demands fugitive from justice and produces certified affidavit
charging fugitive with some crime, then state to which fugutive fled shall arrest fugitive and
deliver him to agent of demanding state); Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86, 88 (1980) (holding
that "sending" state does not have authority under Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, to
question prison condition of receiving state, because interstate extradition is meant to be
summary, executive proceeding), rehearing denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981); Sami v. United States,
617 F.2d 755, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (observing that courts traditionally have read U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, as conferring no rights upon extraditee).
149. See RESTATEMENT, supra note I, § 114 (asserting that courts should interpret federal
statutes to avoid violation of customary law by United States).
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In the past, United States federal courts would not have applied the
custom against inhuman and degrading treatment to a dispute between the
United States and a United States citizen, because the United States federal
courts held that international law only applied to disputes and relations
between the United States and other countries. 150 The judiciary considered
international law inapplicable to disputes between a citizen and the citizen's
sovereign state.'15 In the past decade, however, the judiciary has retreated
significantly from this position, and has been more willing to apply inter-
national customary law to conflicts between a citizen and his sovereign.
152
As a result of the courts' new willingness to apply international custom-
ary law to domestic disputes, the effects of Soering become important
because international customary law potentially affects the United States
government's action towards United States citizens. The extradition of a
person into a nation where a substantial danger exists that the extraditee
will face torture or other inhuman and degrading treatment is a potential
violation of international customary law."' Possibly, due to Soering, a state
in the United States would violate federal common law, which incorporates
customary law, by extraditing a capital offender to Virginia's death row. 54
The leading case in which a federal court applied international customary
law to a human rights dispute between a nation and its own citizen is
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.'55 One of the issues that the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York considered was whether torture
violates international customary law. 5 6 The Filartigas were citizens of the
Republic of Paraguay who applied for political asylum in the United
States.'57 The Filartigas brought suit against Pena-Irala, a citizen of Para-
guay, who had acted under color of state authority. 5 ' The Filartigas alleged
150. See Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.) (stating that violation of
international law cannot occur when plaintiff and defendant are nationals of same country),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); United States v. Matheson, 400 F. Supp. 1241, 1245
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that citizen may not invoke international law in another county
against her sovereign state), aff'd, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
151. See Dreyfus, at 31 (holding that no violation of international law can occur between
citizen and his sovereign); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 143, at 64 (explaining that in previous
decades nations did not answer to international law for crimes against their own citizens).
152. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing citizen of Paraguay
to sue officer of Paraguay); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(allowing Argentinian citizen to sue former Argentinian general); R. L1-UCH, supra note 147,
at 12-16 (describing courts' application of international law to disputes between sovereign state
and their citizens).
153. See supra notes 119-142 and accompanying text (arguing that extradition can be
violation of customary law prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment).
154. See Quigley & Shank, supra note 133, at 271 n. 177 (stating that if European Court's
construction of international law is correct, then states extraditing to Virginia will violate
federal common law).
155. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
156. Id. at 884.
157. Id. at 876.
158. Id. at 878.
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that Pena-Irala caused their son's death by means of torture.'5 9 The court
applied the old rule of international law which excluded violations occurring
between a state and its own citizens from federal jurisdiction.' 60 On appeal
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Claims Act.' 61 The Alien Tort Claims Act requires a
violation of the laws of nations, which includes international custom, in
order to grant jurisdiction. 162 The Second Circuit examined United Nations
General Assembly resolutions, treaties, a European Court of Human Rights's
case, and- the practice of nations to determine if a custom prohibiting torture
exists. 63 The Second Circuit found that the prohibition against torture is a
"clear and unambiguous" violation of the law of nations that applies
equally to aliens and citizens. 64
The Second Circuit's opinion in Filartiga dramatically demonstrates that
customary human rights law is part of United States law and can be applied
by a United States court even when the parties are of the same nationality.
Significantly, the Second Circuit set up a framework for analyzing customary
law that other courts can follow. Following the Second Circuit's example,
other courts should look to treaties, United Nations resolutions, the Re-
statement, and the practice of nations to determine the existence of a certain
custom. Once customary law is found, courts should apply that law as part
of federal common law.
65
Another example of a United States court defining and applying inter-
national customary law is the decision by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California in Forti v. Suarez-Mason.'66 One of
the issues in Forti that the district court considered was whether the
prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment is part of customary
international law.' 67 In Forti, Argentine citizens residing in the United States
brought an action under the Alien Tort Claims Act against a former
Argentine general. 68 Among other claims, the citizens alleged that the
general had violated customary international law by inflicting inhuman and
degrading treatment on their relatives. 69 The district court determined that
the Argentine citizens failed to present evidence indicative of an international
custom prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment. 70 The Forti court
159. Id. at 876.
160. See id. at 880 (referring to United States District Court for Eastern District of New
York's unpublished opinion).
161. Id. at 887.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). The Alien Tort's Claims Act provides that "the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
163. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-85.
164. Id. at 884.
165. Id. at 882.
166. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
167. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
168. Id. at 1531.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1543.
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also indicated that in its own capacity the court was not aware of the
existence of such evidence. 17 In addition to finding a lack of international
custom, the Forti court also had a problem defining how inhuman and
degrading treatment differs from torture or prolonged arbitrary detention.1
72
The court stated that the prohibition both lacked universality and escaped
definition and, therefore, was not a part of international customary law. 73
Although the Forti court ruled that the term "inhuman and degrading
treatment" lacked definability, international tribunals and treaties have
defined inhuman and degrading treatment and have distinguished between
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. 174 The Forti court's statement
that the court knew of no authority of the universality of the custom
prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment is even less reasonable. The
same treaties that the court cites in finding that summary execution is a
violation of international custom, prohibit inhuman and degrading treat-
ment. 175 Furthermore, the court does not discuss the two main requirements
of custom, state practice and opinio juris176 Because of the Forti court's
faulty analysis, its opinion that inhuman and degrading treatment is not
prohibited by customary law should be discounted.
77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also has
struggled with the issue of what constitutes international customary law. In
De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,78 defendant bank under orders
from the Sandinista government expropriated money the bank owed the
plaintiff. 79 The Fifth Circuit considered whether expropriation is a violation
of international customary law.80 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that human
rights which have become part of the law of nations are limited.'' The De
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1543.
174. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of inhuman
and degrading treatment).
175. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1542. See UDHR, supra note 72, art. 5 (stating "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment");
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 63, art. 7 (stating "No one
shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); The
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 63, art. 5(2) (stating "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment"); RrTAE-
mIENT, supra note 1, § 702 (stating "A state violates international law if, as a matter of state
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones ... torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment").
176. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1543.
177. See generally, Note, Remedying Foreign Repression Through U.S. Courts: Ford v.
Suarez-Mason and the Recognition of Torture, Summary Execution, Prolonged Arbitrary
Detention and Causing Disappearance as Cognizable Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 405 (1988).
178. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
179. Id. at 1386-87.
180. Id. at 1397.
181. Id.
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Sanchez court found that the prohibitions against murder, torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment, slavery, and arbitrary detention are part
of international customary law.'1 The court held that no comparable custom
had arisen regarding a state's expropriation of property owned by its own
nationals. 8 3 In dictum, however, the Fifth Circuit recognized that inhuman
and degrading treatment is a violation of customary law.' The court's
opinion in Sanchez, therefore, provides further evidence that courts are
willing to acknowledge international custom as part of United States law,
particularly the custom prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment.
In Ahmad v. Wigen,8 s the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York applied the Soering holding to an extradition case.
Ahmad was a naturalized United States citizen who formerly lived on the
Israeli Occupied West Bank.'8 Ahmad allegedly fired upon an Israeli bus,
killing one person and wounding another.'8 Israel sought Ahmad's extra-
dition from the United States pursuant to the Convention on Extradition
Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the
State of Israel.1'8 Ahmad claimed that his extradition would violate inter-
national law, because Israel would not provide him with due process- and
would subject him to inhuman and degrading treatment; 9 The district court
relied on Soering as the most recent explanation of international law's
relationship to extradition and human rights. 9° The district court followed
the analysis of the Soering opinion closely, stating that in determining
whether extradition is likely to result in international law violations, all
circumstances of the case should be considered. The district court stated
that torture and other inhumane punishments "are now outlawed by civilized
countries." 1 9
The district court followed the general holding of Soering and stated
that persons should not be extradited if a substantial risk that the extraditee
will be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment exists.'9 However,
after receiving testimony and reviewing the evidence, the district court found




185. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.
1990).
186. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 394.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 389.
189. Id. at 395.
190. Id. at 413
191. Id. at 416. Because custom does not require that civilized countries outlaw an act,
the Ahmad court may have applied the law incorrectly. The court may have assumed that the
"laws of nations" referred only to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations." See I.C.J. Statute, art. 38. Custom is also part of the law of nations and only
requires opinlo juris and consistent state practice over a period of time. Id.
192. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 416.
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if extradited to Israel. 193 The district court concluded that the Israeli prison
conditions were not inhuman and degrading, because the conditions were




Ahmad demonstrates that a United States court was willing to apply
Soering to a United States extradition case to determine the legality of the
extradition. The Ahmad court agreed with Soering that extradition into a
real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment would be unlawful. 19 The
Ahmad court's point of divergence from the Soering court is that the
Ahmad court did not find the conditions of the Israeli prison to be inhuman
and degrading. 96 The court was somewhat hesitant to condemn a foreign
prison system, raising the problem that United States courts may be very
reluctant to apply the .terms inhuman and degrading to our own prison
system.
Although the Second Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of New York
in Ahmad, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's analysis. In the
Second Circuit held that "it is the function of the Secretary of State to
determine whether extradition should be denied on humantarian grounds."' 197
In the Second Circuit's view, the executive branch is the branch responsible
for adhering to international law in extradition cases.198 The executive branch
does have primary responsibility for adherence to international law in
extradition cases, but the judicial branch also has a duty to follow inter-
national law.' 99
The District Court's opinion in Ahmad is a step in the right direction
for United States courts. Although the court in Ahmad applied Soering to
international extradition, not interstate extradition, Ahmad demonstrates
that some courts are willing to apply customary law and use analysis and
interpretations of customary law applied by international courts. United
States courts have yet to decide whether customary law also affects interstate
extradition. But logically, customary law must affect interstate extradition,
because federal common law which embodies customary law governs inter-
state extradition.
In conclusion, because international customary law prohibits inhuman
and degrading treatment, that prohibition is part of United States federal
common law.2-° International courts have held that inhuman and degrading
193. Id. at 416-19.
194. Id. at 418.
195. Id. at 416.
196. Id. at 416-18.
197. Abrnad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990).
198. Id.
199. See RE-TATEmENT, supra note 1, § 702 comment o (stating that violation of customary
law prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment also violates international obligations to all
other nations); Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of an
Emerging Rule of Customary International Law, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 161, 197-205 (1990)
(discussing international custom that courts must consider international law).
200. See supra notes 46-118 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition of inhuman
and degrading treatment as custom).
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treatment encompasses extradition if a real risk exists that the extraditee
will be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of the
extradition?2' According to the European Court of Human Rights, youthful,
mentally unstable prisoners face a real risk of experiencing inhuman and
degrading treatment when extradited to Virginia's death row.202 Therefore,
a state which extradites to Virginia's death row may be violating federal
common law. The executive branch has primary responsibility in extradition
cases to ensure that its prisoners are not extradited in violation of the law.
However, the judicial, branch must police the executive branch and question
the executive branch when human rights are at stake. Therefore, it is proper
for United States courts to engage in an analysis of the type of conditions
an extraditee may face in a receiving state prison. -If the court finds that
the prisoner is in real danger of experiencing inhuman and degrading
treatment in the receiving state, the court should not extradite.
LAuRA LEIGH BLACKSTON
201. See supra notes 119-42 and accompanying text (examining extradition as violation of
custom prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment).
202. See supra notes 27-45 and accompanying text (discussing European Court's opinion
in Soering).
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